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We study non-collusive corruption in the education sector. For this purpose, we construct a simple 
theoretical model that captures non-collusive corruption between service providers (teachers) and 
service demanders (students). The model shows that the bribe paid by the service demander increases 
with the level of red tape and her income level, but it decrease with the improvement of the 
individual’s social status. We also establish that with the increase in the income and the social status 
of the private agent (networks), the probability of paying bribes and the severity of red tape declines. 
Then we use a survey data set collected in 2007 by Transparency International Bangladesh, to test the 
predictions of the model. The estimations confirm that both the probability of being subjected to non-
collusive corruption and the cost of corruption is related to the individual characteristics of the bribe 
payer. Moreover, network connections are an important factor that helps to ease the burden of 
corruption on private agents, which is also likely ensuring the persistence of this type of corruption.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
We study causes and possible consequences of non-collusive corruption in the education sector. 
The main focus of our paper is i) to ascertain if informal networks play a part in persistence of 
non-collusive  corruption,  ii)  and  if  non-collusive  corruption  in  education  contributes  to 
inequality. We start our analysis by building a simple theoretical model to obtain insights on 
how non-collusive corruption affects provision of public services to households.  Then using 
survey data from Transparency International Bangladesh for 2007, we test hypotheses based on 
the predictions of the theoretical model.  
The first contribution of this paper is that it shows that a membership in informal networks 
can benefit the private agent by allowing getting favorable corrupt deals. The existence of such 
private gains from membership of informal networks creates a self-reinforcing structure that 
supports  the  persistence  of  such  non-collusive  corruption.    For  example,  it  is  known  that 
collusive corruption creates gains for  private agents, and hence incentives not to report corrupt 
bureaucrats  is  given  as  one  of  main  reasons  why  corruption  exhibits  persistence  (see  e.g. 
Bardhan,  1997).  However,  this  reasoning  cannot  explain  the  persistence  of  non-collusive 
corruption,  where  private  agents  seemingly  do  not  have  any  gains.  In  a  theoretical  paper, 
Foellmi and Oechslin (2007) argue that non-collusive corruption not only redistributes income 
from non-officials towards officials but also within the group of potential entrepreneurs by 
limiting  market  entry.    This  creates  an  incentive  for  such  corruption  practice  to  persist. 
However, we cannot use this rationale to explain persistency of non-collusive corruption in 
provision of education or health care services.  The reason is that in this case, exclusion of some 
individuals from these services will not create rents to those who are receiving the services, 
unlike to the case with firms.  
To address this issue, in our model we use the intuition based on the following papers.   
Kingston (2007, 2008) theoretically shows that if a government official and a member of the 
public  share  informal  social  or  economic  ties,  this  may  enable  them  to  enforce  bribe 
transactions. This situation can lead to the development of a “culture” of corruption that can 
subsequently prove hard to dislodge. A similar conclusion is made by Çulea and Fulton (2009) 
about re-enforcing nature of externalities created by such a “culture”; more cheating by firms is 
good for bribe-taking inspectors and more bribe-taking inspectors are good for cheating firms. 
Véron  et.  al.  (2006)  find  that  when  the  vertical  accountabilities  are  weak,  horizontal 
accountability structures between local civil society and officials can mutate into networks of 
corruption in which ‘‘community’’ actors become accomplices or primary agents.  Along these 
lines, we study whether those who use private networks to avoid excessive red tape pay less in 3 
 
bribes.2 Our empirical results corroborate the findings we obtain from the theoretical model. 
The results show that the social status of the students (or their parents) is a significant factor in 
reducing the burden of non -collusive corruption.  Hence, this outcome works in support of 
perpetuating non-collusive corruption as predicted by Kingston (2007, 2008), Çulea and Fulton 
(2009) and Véron  et. al. (2006). Moreover, our results corroborate Hunt (2004) who finds that 
networks facilitate the replacement of a bribe with an implicit quid pro quo, and that older 
people and residents of small town who are more likely to establish networks bribe less.   Since 
the poor often have lower social status and hence lack influential network connections, thus this 
finding also explains why corruption can reduce equity.  
 
Another issue we analyzed in this paper is how non-collusive corruption in education affects 
inequality. In this regard,   the relevant literature indicates that corruption affects income 
inequality and poverty through reduction of economic growth, an increase in the progressivity 
of taxes, unequal access to services such as education and healthcare, and by creating an 
unequal distribution of wealth. For example, Gupta et al. (2002), Li et al. (2000), and Gyimah -
Brempong (2002) found a significant effect of corruption on inequality using cross-country and 
panel data analyses, while Begović (2007) obtains a similar result based on a theoretical model. 
Moreover,  the  relationship  between  corruption  and  inequality  is  likely  to  flow  in  both 
directions. In this regard, You and Khagram (2005) argue that income inequality increases the 
level  of  corruption  through  material  and  normative  mechanisms.    All  the  above-mentioned 
studies  relate  corruption  measures  to  aggregate  inequality  measures  (such  as  the  Gini 
coefficient).3  However, there is also some microeconomic evidence that sheds light on the 
mechanisms linking corruption and inequality.4  Inequality is promoted by corruption as public 
agents can treat public service demanders unequally, in the first place. For example, Olken and 
Barron  (2009)  find  the  existence  of  price  discrimination  on  the  basis  of  observable 
characteristics, which  is evidence of complex pricing mechanism by corrupt officials.    Hunt 
(2007a) who shows that victims of misfortune are more likely than non-victims to bribe public 
officials.  Hunt (2007b) studies public health care in Peru and Uganda and finds that rich 
patients are more likely to bribe. Hunt (2004) examines the bribes using data from 34 countries, 
                                                      
2 We use the term bribe when a household pays some amount for getting an educational service, which they are 
entitled to get free of charge. Similarly, we use the term extortion when the service provider compels households to 
pay something in exchange for nothing. The distinction between bribery and extortion, albeit in a different context, is 
provided in Khalil et al. (2010). 
3 The bulk of the existing empirical work on corruption mostly based on the macro level perception based corruption 
measures.  This  type  measure  might  be  prone  to  shortcomings,  which  are  discussed  in  e.g.  Galtung  (2006)  and 
Sik(2002), Fisman and Gatti (2002), Mauro (1995), Treisman (2000), Olson et al. (2000). 
4 Svensson (2003), Kaufmann and Wei (1999), analyze the corrupt interactions between firms and public officials,  
and Hunt (2007a) , Hunt (2007b), Hunt (2004),   Deininger and Mpuga (2004), Mocan (2004), Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky (2003), Swamy et al. (2001) study individual bribery. See Banerjee and Pande 2009 for a review.   4 
 
and finds that rich people pay the most bribes while poor the least. However, she also finds that 
the factor such as city size, age, sex, and ownership of a car all have a larger effect on bribery 
than income.  Svensson (2003) finds that more profitable firms pay larger bribes. Mocan (2004) 
also finds that individuals with higher income and education levels are more likely to be asked 
for bribes.    
Notably,  there  is  not  much  research  is  done  on  corruption  in  the  education  sector,  in 
general, how this type of corruption is related to inequality, in particular. Although,  Biswal 
(1999)  theoretically  analyzed  corruption  in  education  sector,  the  results  have  not  been 
substantiated  empirically.  The  empirical  work  on  this  issue  is  also  scanty.    For  example, 
Cockcroft et al. (2002) indicate that the poor have less access to health services and are less 
likely to enroll their children in school. The World Bank's Voices of the Poor survey (1999) 
reports that poor people suffer from corruption in obtaining health care, getting education for 
their children, claiming social assistance, and in accessing the justice system or receiving police 
protection.   This  paper contributes  in  this  respect  by  offering some  new  evidence  on  what 
factors  determine  corruption  in  the  education  sector.  We  identify  the  characteristics  of 
households who are more likely to pay bribes to get educational services from their immediate 
providers. These characteristics include education, wealth, and the age of the parents, as well as 
the strength of their network connections.  Unlike firm level corruption data where business is 
reluctant to reveal the actual bribe payment because of its sensitivity; our data do not suffer 
from  such  bias.    Specifically,  our  results  show  that  non-collusive  corruption  in  education 
increases  inequality  by  disadvantaging  the  poor.  The  results  also  indicate  the  poor,  less 
educated and lower social status people are subjected to higher red tape and they effectively 
pay higher bribes or are more likely to make so called “voluntary” contributions to schools.  
Therefore, the results of the empirical investigation are supportive of the hypothesis: namely, 
non-collusive corruption creates an unequal burden amongst the private agents and favors the 
rich and well connected over the poor and socially isolated.  
Most importantly, our results on the relationship between corruption and inequality differ 
from what is found by Hunt (2007b, 2004), Mocan (2004) and Svensson (2003).  We find, on 
the contrary to them, the poor pay more bribes than the rich. This difference might be stemming 
from the fact that overall higher income people are more active and hence, have higher demand 
for public services, and thus, pay more bribes overall.  In addition, the gains from informal 
networks that what decreases the burden on non-collusive corruption on the rich, while the 
poor lacking access to such networks have to shoulder the brunt of corruption. In other words, 
in terms of an individual transaction, the burden of bribes still can be lower, for wealthier 
people than for the poorer people. The results could also depend on the nature of the service. 
Unlike healthcare, where people can choose doctors and hospitals, the education provider is a 5 
 
monopoly,  especially  in  rural  areas,  because  parents  (practically)  do  not  have  choice  to 
alternative schools. In this aspect, our findings support Hunt (2007a), who demonstrates that 
the need for public services drives the bribery not the income level per se. Based on our results 
we also conclude that corrupt public agents in the education sector can discriminate private 
agents based on their individual characteristics. Hence, our results complement the findings on 
the price discrimination of truck drivers by Olken and Barron (2009).  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we present the theoretical model 
and draw empirical implications.  In Section 3, the data used is described, which is followed by 
explanation  of  the  empirical  strategy,  in  Section  4.  In  Section  5,  we  present  the  estimation 
results and Section 6 concludes our paper. 
2.  The Model 
In this section we present the theoretical basis of our empirical analysis.  A somewhat similar 
model of corruption in education is considered in Biswal (1999). However, corruption in that 
model is cast as a sale of club goods, while in our model we consider it as an independent 
interaction between a teacher and a student (or a parent).  
In the model, there are two types of agents that interact directly: the service suppliers (S) 
and service demanders (D).  The supplier is supposed to provide an amount of services,  q , at 
per unit social cost,C , given exogenously.  The per unit private value of the service is  C   .  
The value attached to the service depends on the quality of the services, and may vary in the 
range  of    [ , ] C    .  Thus,  these services  generate  positive  social  welfare.    By  design,  the 
suppliers are supposed to provide services that are valued as Vq   , where q is the maximum 
amount to be received by the demander. We assume that the cost is covered by government, 
and hence, the services are provided free of charge. 
So according to this model, by increasing red tape the supplier effectively creates rents and 
captures them. In our context this means that the public supplier of the service creates red tape 
to force the demander either to pay bribes or to buy the service at a private outlet operated by 
the same supplier. It is expected that higher red tape should be related to the higher demand for 
the  services  (or  effective  supply  to  the  originally  public  domain  demanders)  from   private 
outlets. 5 
                                                      
5 The supplier uses his position and the imperfect monitoring to create rents for himself. The mechanism used for 
rent creation is red tape. In our context, red tape is pure non-pecuniary cost (as in Banerjee , 1997). This cost can be 
either a time cost or a physiological cost caused by harassment exerted by the supplier of the service.    As Shleifer 
and Vishny (1993) demonstrate, red tape results in shortage of the services being provided, and those who can 
accept the higher prices buy it with a mark-up to the statutory price.  The mark-up is either an amount of bribe or in 
some cases is just obtaining the service (education or healthcare) at higher private prices.   6 
 
 Formally,  the  outcome  for  the  demander  in  the  presence  of  red  tape  is  stated  as 
() V q b q q      if the service demander pays bribes, and  Vq    if she does not pay bribes, 
where b  is a bribe paid or a markup paid if the demander is forced to obtain the service from a 
private outlet.  It is also possible that instead of the bribe the agent may use her influential 
connections,  which  is  assumed  also  incurs  some  costs  to  her.  In  th is environment,  both  the 
quality  and  quantity  of  the  service  being  provided  deteriorates  due  to  red  tape,  i.e. 
 andq q q .  Those who are willing to pay bribes or other forms of side-payments 
get a higher, both in quality and quantity, amount of services.   
The suppliers maximize their objective function by choosing the level of red tape, taking into 
account both the participation constraint of the service demanders and the penalty constraint 
for  being  corrupt.  The  red  tape  may  not  be  homogenously  applied  to  all  demanders.  It  is 
possible that the social status of the demander may also affect the level of red tape to which she 
is subjected.  In this context, a somewhat related issue is to ascertain if those who use their 
connections to avoid red tape pay less in bribes or other illicit payments.    
Note that the rent captured by the teachers can be expressed by bribes, illegal payments to 
the  school  or  the  teacher,  or  private  tutorials.  Use  of  networks  or  referra ls  from  influential 
people  can  be  costly  for  the  student,  but  may  not  bring  any  rents  to  the  teacher  directly.  
However, usually in societies with strong informal networks, favors must be returned, so the 
teacher may get some favors from the influential person at some point in the future.  
Given  the  discussion  about  the  environment  in  general,  now,  we  proceed  to the  formal 
analysis of the optimization problems of both the service demander and supplier.  
 
 3.2 Service demander’s problem 
We assume that the service demander has the following utility function: 
 
1 ( , ) u c s c s
   ,  (1) 
where c is the amount of consumption of goods and s is the value  of  the services demanded. 
 The service demander is endowed with income y , which is used to purchase consumption good 
and pay bribes in the process of obtaining services. Then her consumption of goods and services 
are given as follows: 
  () c y b q q       (2) 
  ( ) (1 )( ) s q q q hq q             (3) 
where  is the Dirac measure, 
 








b is  the  bribe  rate,   is  the  parameter  of  benefit  from  paying  bribes,   q  is    the  red  tape  
parameter as the public agent exerts pressure on the private service demander by limiting the 
amount of services available6, his a set of individual characteristics.  
Then the agent’s problem is expressed as the following: 
  max  ( , )
q u c s ,  (4) 
subject to (2) and (3). 
From the FOC, we can establish that the agent pays bribes and demands higher quality and 
quantity of services only if the following condition holds:  
  [ ( ), ( )] [ ,( ) ] u y b q q q q q u y hq q          .  (5) 
By inserting (2) and (3) into (1), the problem given by (4) is transformed into unconstraint one, 
a solution of which entails the following equilibrium amount of services demanded: 
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.  (6) 
3.2 Service supplier’s problem 
Since we are interested in the relationship between the service supplier and demander, we 
abstract here from the problem that arises in considering the relationship between the service 
supplier and the government. For that purpose we assume that the monitoring and penalty 
system allows for the service supplier to be corrupt and seek personal gain by abusing his 
position. We assume that the service provider supplies the lowest possible quantity of services, 
q, for the given level of penalty and monitoring effort by the government, that allows him to 
avoid  losing  his  position.   It  is  also  assumed  that  there  N agents  in  the  service  providers 
jurisdiction;  n  out of them end up paying bribes to the service provider.  Then the service 
supplier’s problem is given by: 
  max  [ ( )]
b v w nb q q  ,  (7) 
subject to  
  [ ( ), ( )] [ ,( ) ] u y b q q q q q u y hq q          ,  (8) 
  0 Nn .  (9) 
For the sake of tractability we assume that the service provider’s utility function is given by: 
  () v w b q q    . 
Constraint  (9)  holds  with  equality  assuming  homogenous  agents.  However,  if  the  service 
demanders are heterogeneous then only a fraction of the agents, that satisfy constraint(8), will 
be included. That isNn  . Since, income and other individual characteristics are exogenously 
                                                      
6 As it is shown in Shleifer and Vishny (1993) 8 
 
given, we can assume that only an exogenously given fraction,  1   , satisfies constraint (8), 
hence we can write nN   . 
By incorporating the last discussion and the specific form of the service demander’s utility 
function,  we  re-state  the  service  provider’s  problem  as  maximization  of  the  corresponding 
Lagrangian: 
 
     
11
max  = ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) .
b L w Nb q q
y b q q q q q y hq q
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
   

  
        
  (10) 
Hence, the optimality conditions are given as follows: 
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.  (13) 
Here  we  follow  the  conditions  specified  by  the  Kuhn -Tucker  theorem.  Hence,  if  we 
assume 0   ,  then  this  means  the  service  provider  does  not  have  to  take  into  account  the 
participation  constraint  imposed  on  the  service  demander.  This  is  obviously  not  an  optimal 
solution, as the demander may demand zero services if the price is prohibitive. 
Thus, we assume  0    and     
11
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 Therefore, 
* 0 b  , hence, this assumption satisfies the 
participation constraints of both types of agents.  By inserting (14) into (13) we can solve for , 
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  (15) 
as required by the optimality condition.  This confirms that results given by (13) and (14) are 
optimal. 
The  discussion  above  provides  us  with  testable  hypotheses,  which  are  stated  as  the 
following proposition.  9 
 
Proposition: The bribe paid by the service demander increase with the level of red tape and 
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Proof: See Appendix A.1 
Having stated the refutable hypotheses, stemming from our analytical model, we now turn 
to the presentation of our empirical strategy and the description of the data.    
 
3.  The Environment of the Study, the Survey Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1  Education and Corruption in Bangladesh 
 
Studying  corruption  in  the  context  of  Bangladesh  is  important  and  interesting  for  various 
reasons. The country was ranked lowest in the global ranking of Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) developed by Transparency International (TI), consecutively for five years from 2001 to 
2005. In the following two years (2006 to 2007), its position marginally improved (6th and 7th, 
respectively).  Perception  based  governance  indicators  prepared  by  the  World  Bank  (2007) 
reveal  low  ratings  for  Bangladesh  on  six  key  indicators,  with  a  particularly  poor  rating  on 
control of corruption, regulatory quality and rule of law. In addition, an investment climate 
survey by World Bank (2003) from 1001 manufacturing firms operating in Bangladesh showed 
that  nearly  60  per  cent  of  these  firms  stated  corruption  was  the  most  serious  constraint, 
followed by poor infrastructure. 
In terms of schooling, Bangladesh has achieved good progress in gender parity in schooling 
outcomes. This has been made possible due to the government’s various stipend programs for 
children in primary and secondary schools. The government has adopted a universal primary 
education system which is free for all children. Incentives to attend primary school have been 
introduced with the distribution of free textbooks and provision of "food for education"—the 
latter was converted to a cash stipend in 2002.7 The government also  provides scholarship 
(Upabritti) and financial assistance for female  secondary school  students to increase school 
                                                      
7 The government provides a poor student a stipend of Tk. 100 (US$1.5) (for one student) and Tk. 125 (US$1.9) for 
two or more students from the same family. 10 
 
enrolment  and  reduce  drop-out  rates  especially  for  girls.8  A  large  section  of  the  country’s 
national budget is set aside to help put these programs into action and to promote education 
and make it more accessible. 
Despite government efforts to increase enrolment there has been some setbacks in recent 
years. The total primary school enrolment fell from 94 percent for boys and 91 percent for girls 
in  2003  to  79  percent  and  81  percent  in  2008,  respectively.9  According  to  a  report  by 
Bangladesh bureau of educational information and statistics   (BANBES) in 2008 ne arly  50 
percent of primary school students drop out before they complete grade five , and that the 
grade-10 completion rate is than 20 percent . According to TIB’s Corruption Database Report 
2005 (TIB 2006), the education sector was ranked the most corrupt sector. 
Anecdotal evidence shows that corruption in education sector in Bangladesh occurs in a 
number of ways. It is often the case that final exam or entrance exam papers are sold in advance 
to high-paying candidates or to favour particular students. It is also common to manipulate oral 
or  practical  examinations  results  which  even  more  open  to  corruption  as  evaluations  are 
subjective  and  difficult  to  monitor.  Although  primary  education  is  free  for  all,  it  becomes 
prohibitively expensive for poor families as the reality requires paying for private tutors in 
order to pass. This private tutoring is likely to exacerbate inequalities, as teachers provide paid 
supplementary  tutoring  after  school  hours.  These  teachers  usually  teach  only  parts  of  the 
curriculum  during  school  hours,  and  thus  force students  to  pay  for  the  rest  during  private 
lessons. Teacher beating students or misbehaving with them or fixing of final results are also 
very common problems. 
Motivated  and  efficient  teachers  are  crucial  for  quality  in  teaching.  However,  absent  or 
abusive teachers often demands for illegal fees. The proceeds from such fees, as well as other 
favours  received  as  payment,  are  frequently  for  the  private  gain  of  educators.  It  is  not 
uncommon to find pupils exploited as unpaid labour, physical abuse, or simply classes where no 
teaching is conducted at all. Nearly half of the rural poor students get stipends from government 
but many of them are deprived of getting the right amount or facing frequent problem not 
getting the stipend in due time. According to TIB (2006), 40% of households reported having 
paid ‘donations’ or bribes for enrolling their children in primary schools. The harassment comes 
in different forms by collecting unauthorized payments from students for various services such 
as  fees  for  admission  into  school,  charging  money  for  textbooks  which  are  free  of  costs, 
                                                      
8 Under the  girls’ stipend program, all girls in rural areas who enter secondary school are eligible for a monthly sum 
ranging from Taka 25 in Class 6 to Taka 60 in Class 10 (between US$0.37– $0.88 in July 2006). They also receive 
additional payments for new books. The conditions to get stipend are (1) a minimum of 75% attendance rate; (2) at 
least a 45% score in annual school exams, and (3) staying unmarried until sitting for the Secondary School Certificate 
(SSC) or turning 18. 
 
9 Bangladesh Economic Review, 2010 11 
 
collecting fee for sports and recreation purposes, subscription for religious activities, fees for 
examination. 
 The high drop-out rate and sluggishness in the improvement of school enrolment rates in 
recent  years  suggest  that  merely  providing  cash  incentives  may  not  improve  the  schooling 
outcome of children. One potential reason for high drop-out rates is negligence of teachers in 
performing their duty.10  Though there are officials at the thana (sub-district) level who monitor 
the activities of teachers in schools ,  they seldom visiting schools.  Anecdotal  evidence  and 
newspaper reports is that there are a number  of irregularities involved in getting the stipend 
which includes persuasion through influential persons, personal request to the head/class 
teacher or payment of bribe/commission for entitlement.   
 
3.2 The Data and the Summary Statistics 
The survey was conducted by TIB in 2007 with a view to (1) to identify the sectors or 
services  where  households  experience  corruption  (2)  to  assess  the  nature  and  extent  of 
corruption and harassment in selected institutions/services in public and private sectors. TIB 
usually does year round scanning of newspapers to identify some sectors that were found to be 
very corrupt, and the corruption perception index (CPI) is based on those newspaper reports. 
As newspaper reports are subject to bias, in view of the criticisms from government and other 
agencies  TIB  conducted  this  household  survey  to  get  a  more  objective  assessment  about 
corruption. The survey covered households’ experience with mostly petty corruption from July 
2006 to June 2007. In the survey, corruption is defined as more than bribery. It is defined as 
abuse of entrusted power for personal gain manifest in six common forms –bribery, negligence 
of duties, nepotism, embezzlement, deception and extortion. The educational institutions we are 
dealing  with  are  either  government  or  semi-government  schools11and, it is expected that 
teachers  would  provide  the  same  services  to  everybody  in  the  absence  of  red  tape  or 
harassment. 
For selecting households for the survey, a three stage stratified cluster sampling method 
was  followed.  The  Integrated  Multipurpose  Sampling  (IMPS)  Frame  developed  by  the 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) was used as  the  sampling frame.12  A total of 5,000 
                                                      
10Teacher  absence  in  school  is  one  of  the  most  serious  problems  in  Bangladesh  and  in  many  other  developing 
countries, and it has been documented in various studies (Chaudhury et al., 2006; Kremer et al., 2005). Chaudhury et 
al.  (2006)  find  15.5%  primary  school  teacher  absence  rate  in  Bangladesh.  Sometimes  teachers  do  not  go  to 
classroom to teach even if they are present in school. Glewwe et al. (2000) find that despite presence of teachers in 
school there are 12 percent of the teachers being absent in the classroom during class hour in Kenya. 
11 Almost all primary level (grades 1-5) schools are government-managed. Secondary schools (grades 6 -10) are 
mostly semi-government, often government-subsidized and community-managed but run according to government 
rules and regulation.  
12  The IMPS design consists of 1,000  Mauzas  distributed in 16 strata according to rural, municipality and SMA 
(Statistical Metropolitan Area) throughout the country. There were 6 rural, 6 urban and 4 SMA strata. These  Mauzas 
constitute the PSUs in this sampling frame. 12 
 
households were interviewed from 87 sub-district (thana),13 3,000 (60%) from rural areas and 
2,000 (40%) from urban areas. There were 250 Primary Sampling Units (PSU). Among them 
150 were for rural areas and 100 were for urban areas. Then 250 PSUs were distributed in 16 
strata according to the national population weights of those strata.  At the first stage, PSUs or 
Mauzas were selected randomly from each of 16 strata.  Then a block of 200 households was 
constructed randomly from each PSU. As there are some PSUs in the IMPS that have less than 
200 households, households from adjacent Mauzas were added to those PSUs. The PSUs covered 
62 out of 64 districts in Bangladesh with divisional and rural–urban population representations.  
In this paper, we consider households reporting interaction with schools for their children’s 
education. They constitute about 72.2% or 3636 households, out of which about 60% are from 
rural areas. 
The basic socio-economic and outcome variables at the household level are reported in 
Table 1. Below we discuss some statistics from the survey (most of which are not reported in 
Table 1) to understand the nature and extent of corruption in primary and secondary schools. 
The descriptive statistics indicate that more than 50% of household heads attained primary 
education or more, while 34% household heads were illiterate. The proportions of population 
belonging  to  the  Muslim  and  Hindu  community  were  89.7%  and  9.2%  respectively.  9%  of 
surveyed households did not own any land, while a further 56% were functionally landless 
(owning less than 0.5 acre of holding). Average monthly income of a household is about Tk. 
10,000. Rural household per-capita income (Tk. 7,489) is almost half that of urban households 
(Tk. 13,285).14  Average monthly expenditure of a household is Tk. 7,345 with corresponding 
figures for rural and urban areas   being  Tk. 5,643 and Tk. 9,875 respectively.   The average 
household size in the survey is 5.5. 
About  11.6%  students  of  surveyed  households  encountered  irregularities  in  getting 
admission to educational institutions in the year prior to the survey. This number is quite high 
considering the fact that not all of them need to  get admission to a new school in a given year. 
Such irregularities were found  to be  higher in rural areas ( 13%) than in urban areas ( 9%) 
though there is  much less competition for admitting into school in rural areas. Of those who 
experienced irregularities, 64.4% had to pay donation or unauthorized payments for admission. 
Taking assistance from influential people or using networks was the next dominant irregularity 
(33.4%). On average, parents who paid bribes had to pay Tk. 574 to get admission. The students 
in urban areas paid bribes equal to three times that of rural areas.  
                                                      
13 Thana is the local administrative unit where police, judiciary and the educational administration (officers who 
monitor the quality of education) are located. 
14 In 2007, 1US$=68Taka (approx). 13 
 
About  87%  students  reported  that  their  educational  institutions  had  provided  regular 
classes; 21.5% reported engaging class teachers as private tutors because they did not receive 
adequate attention in the classroom. The extent of having private tutors is pervasive among 
high school level students. As high as 31.4% of high school students reported having private 
tutors;  38.7  %  of  students  in  households  who  reported  having  tutors,  admitted  to  having 
benefited  from  private  tutors  and,  about  50%  received  tips  for  exam  questions  or  got 
exaggerated marks in the exam. Students who did not have any private tutor reported instances 
of  misbehavior  by  teachers  for  not  engaging  them  as  private  tutors  (60%).    Besides, 
misbehavior  (e.g.,  rebuking  unnecessarily,  not  providing  feedbacks  in  classroom)  in  the 
classroom and non-cooperation by the concerned teachers were reported by 19% and 34.5% 
students respectively.  
Overall,  25.1%  students  of  households  reported  receiving  a  stipend  (upabritti).  Among 
those students who got upabritti, 22.0% experienced harassment for receiving this. Of those 
students who faced harassment, 74.6% of them paid bribe for the enlistment, and paid Tk. 90.72 
as bribe. The major beneficiaries are headmasters (44.7%) and class teachers (42.4%). Among 
other beneficiaries are Union Parishad Chairman and Members, Thana project officer and bank 
officials.  The  households  reported  several  reasons  for  not  being  enlisted  for  a  scholarship.  
About 31.6% reported that school authorities failed to enlist their eligible students. The parents 
also had to pay additional money to school on different occasion. As many  as 18 % parents paid 
money without any receipt by school authorities with such incidence is the highest (around 
26.2%) in primary schools in rural areas.  
4.  Empirical Strategy 
The theoretical model indicates that the red tape suffered, and bribes paid, by the private agents 
are explained by individual characteristics (such as gender, minority status, income or social 
status). We first examine the factors that determine the probability of being subjected to red 
tape using a probit model with the following specification: 
  () ij j ij ij prob redtape X       ,  (16) 
where  1 ij redtape  if a household i in area j is subject to harassment or paid a bribe.  X includes 
vector  of demographic  and socio-economic  characteristics  of  the  household,  j  is  the  fixed 
effects specified at  the  police  station  or  thana  level.15  We include a number of variables in 
X such as age, sex, education and religion of household head, sex of the respondent, number of 
                                                      
15 Probit estimates with fixed effects give rise to inconsistent coefficients of the fixed effects. However, when the 
number of observations per fixed effect is at least 8, we can consistently estimate the fixed effects (Heckman 1981). 
We have 50 observations per thana and so the model is consistently estimated. We do not estimate school fixed 
effects as we are interested also to see the effects of school level characteristics. The formal institutional mechanisms 
are the same within the thana, as thana is the administrative unit.  14 
 
male and female adults in the households, land area and the total monthly expenditure of the 
household. We use expenditure rather than income despite the availability of both as the former 
is a better proxy for permanent income, and household socio-economic status. The use of both 
land and household expenditure would allow us to examine whether poor households receive 
less service than rich households. We also control separately for number gender of children 
studying to examine the differential effects on harassment/bribe of sending a son as opposed to 
a daughter to school. To examine the local school and teacher level characteristics, we control 
for whether the school teacher comes to class regularly, encourage students to come to their 
house for private tuition, and whether they influence the exam results (such as by changing 
marks or giving exam tips). We cluster standard errors at the thana level.16 
In specification (16) we follow Svensson (2003) and assume that both the incidence of 
corruption  and  the  level  of  bribes  paid  are  determined  by  the  same  set  of  individual 
characteristics of the private service demander. In our case, the intuition for this assumption is 
even simpler than in Svensson (2003), who studied why firms pay bribes. The firms in his study 
had heterogeneous dealings with the bureaucrats; hence, the incidence of corruption di ffered 
depending on the nature of the interactions between firms and bureaucrats.  In the current 
environment, the interaction between the service supplier and demander is homogenous across 
the agents, as they deal with only one type of service. However,  public agents may create red 
tape to get rents.  Private agents might use connections to avoid red tape and pay less in bribes. 
To ascertain this, we examine if the informal networks create real rents for the members. The 
empirical  model  to  test  the  hypothe sis  about  the  incidence  of  bribery  or  harassment  is 
formulated as follows: 
  () ij j ij ij prob redtape X network            (17) 
where the term “network” dummy is introduced to examine whether the informal networks 
help  overcome  red  tape  or  the  incidence  of  bribery.  If  we  find  a  negative  and  significant 
coefficient of  , then it gives us another explanation for the persistence of corruption.  That is to 
say that corruption is more of a network problem or a problem of interest groups, than rent 
seeking of individual position holders. As soon as a membership in the informal network creates 
rents, agents will be engaged in corrupt deals to reap those rents.  Therefore, penalties designed 
against  individuals  for  being  corrupt  may  not  reduce  corruption  as  it  leaves  the  informal 
network intact.    
However, the network variable might be endogenous- people with better informal network 
are  likely  to  be  different  than  those  who  do  not  have  any,  or  only  have  weak,  networks. 
Therefore, unobservables that affect the network could also affect the red tape variable. In order 
                                                      
16 We also clustered standard error at the students’ school level and results are unchanged. 15 
 
to solve the endogeneity problem, we need to find an instrumental variable which is correlated 
with  networkbut  not  withredtape.  It  should  also  satisfy  the  exclusion  restriction,  i.e.,  the 
instrument affects  redtapeonly throughnetwork. In the absence of a suitable instrument, we 
report results using simple probit estimates. Our goal here is not to estimate the causal effect of 
network on  redtape. We are rather interested to show how people with networks can cause 
corruption to persist. Thus, endogeneity is not a major concern in this case. In robustness check 
of our results, we address this concern using IV estimates. 17 
According to the analytical model, the level of red tape is positively related to the amount of 
bribe paid. Red tape in our case is expressed by harassment or other irregularities. Next we 
consider the level of bribes paid and the factors that affect it. Since there are households who 
also did not pay bribes we run the following regression and estimate using a Tobit model.  
 
  (18)                                                                                          ij ij j ij network X bribe           
where  ij bribe is the amount of bribe or donation paid by agent i in sub-district j for a given 
service. It includes the total amount of money spent to get services including money paid to 
others who might have helped to get the service. All other variables are as explained above. We 
define  network  variable  equal  to  one  if  a  household  reports  using  relatives,  friends,  or 
influential  people  (e.g.,  local  elected  representative) to  assist,  or  exert influence, when  they 
faced with difficulties everyday life (not just for their child education but for any matters that 
could arise in daily life), and zero otherwise.  
5.  Estimation Results 
We  estimate  a  number  of  equations  in  our  regression.  We  use  probit  model  for  a  binary 
outcome  and  OLS or  Tobit  for continuous  or censored outcome measures. Our  variables  of 
interests are the following: 
1.  whether respondent is seeking child’s admission to school (binary variable), 
2.  whether respondent paid any bribe for admission into school (binary variable), , 
3.  the amount of  bribe paid to get admission into school (censored variable), 
4.  whether respondent is receiving a stipend (binary variable),, 
5.  the amount of bribe paid  to get stipend (censored variable), 
6.  whether the respondent paid a donation without receipt for child’s study in school 
(binary variable),, 
                                                      
17 We also estimate a Heckman-type selection model when the dependent variable is the amount of bribe. In that case, we 
run a probit model to estimate the probability of bribing and then use the resulting residual (Mills-ratio) to estimate the bribe 
equation using OLS. The results do not differ with those reported below using simple probit/Tobit.  16 
 
7.  any extra fee (informal payments) paid to school for different reasons (censored 
variable), 
8.  total bribe paid for admission and extra fees to school for different purposes 
(continuous/censored); 
The estimated results are discussed in light of our theoretical model: first we discuss if our 
findings support the hypothesis about networks creating gains for its members, then we discuss 
if corruption in education contributes to inequality by discriminating the poor. 
5.1.  Networks 
First  we consider if having  informal  network connections decrease  the  probability  of  being 
harassed in seeking child admission to school. The results reported in Table 2 imply that people 
having a network find it easier to have their child admitted into school. However, the variable is 
statistically insignificant. We also estimate the probability of whether a household paying bribes 
to get admission depends on network connections. The point estimates indicate that having 
network matters—people using connections are less likely to pay a bribe to get admission. The 
estimates in column 4 of Table 3 indicate that people who have informal network connections 
are 15 percentage points less likely to pay a bribe.18 The results from tobit regression reported 
in Table 4  indicate that people with a network pay nearly Tk. 700 less conditional on their 
income, assets and other socioeconomic characteristics. 
When we consider the distribution of stipends disb ursed to students from the school, the 
network variable is not statistically significant (see Table 5). The coefficient estimate indicates 
that network does not significantly  reduce the probability of being sufferer in getting stipend 
money.    However,  having network connections reduces the amount to be  paid to school 
teachers. This is indicated by the coefficient estimates of a Tobit model for the amount of bribe 
paid on network and other covariates as reported in  Table 6. We consider separately if forced 
donations made by the parents depend on network connections. In this case, the network 
variable is also significant and negative indicating that people use network connections to avoid 
paying or at least people with better informal connection are less likely (18 percentage points) 
to pay such donations (see Table 7). 
Next, we estimate a Tobit regression where the dependent variable is informal payments 
made  to  school  for  different  reaso ns  (e.g.,  in  the  name  of  some  extracurricular  activity, 
classroom renovation, etc.). We find that people with network connections pay significantly less 
than those did not have networks. On average they pay 60 -75 taka less (see Table 8). The 
results are similar when we add all types of bribes and donations (see Table 9). Estimates from 
                                                      
18 We do not model the bribe conditional on being a victim since those who are not victim do not pay any bribe, and 
hence probit estimate would only consider those victimized.  
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the Tobit model indicate that, conditional on a children being admitted to a new school in that 
year, parents having network connections are paying less, by about 475-600 taka depending on 
the specification of the regression.  As an additional evidence of gains from networks we also 
find in all the specification used, that older households pay smaller amounts in bribes and other 
illicit payments. 
Our  results  confirm  the  theoretical  conjecture  of  our  own  model  about  importance  of 
informal  networks  in  non-collusive  corruption.  The  results  also  substantiate  the  theoretical 
findings of Kingston (2007, 2008) ,Véron  et. al. (2006) and Çulea and Fulton (2009) about 
informal social or economic ties creating a “culture” of corruption that can subsequently prove 
hard to dislodge.  These results also corroborate Hunt (2004) who finds that networks facilitate 
the replacement of a bribe with an implicit quid pro quo, and that older people and residents of 
small town who are more likely to establish networks bribe less. 
5.2.  Inequality 
To  relate  the  burden  of  corruption  to  the  income  level  and  social  status,  we  examine  the 
determinants of probability of being a victim of corruption in seeking child admission to school 
and whether a household paid bribes to get admission.  Our focus is on if wealth or social status 
plays some part in this process (see Table 2 and Table 3). The results show that educated 
people are less likely to be a victim.  The coefficient of age of household head is negative and 
education is positive, implying that older and better educated households are less likely to pay 
bribes.  Wealthy  people  are  likely  to  suffer  less  harassment  in  seeking  admission  of  their 
children as shown in the corresponding estimates of the coefficient of land which is negative 
and statistically significant. Since land is a continuous variable, the marginal effects reported in 
Table 2 indicate that a person owning maximum land (100 acres) in the sample is likely to 
suffer  82  percent  less  than  person  do  not  own  any  land.  Parents  of  girls  are  likely  to  be 
harassed, while being a parent of a boy has no effect on the probability of being harassed when 
seeking admission into school. The probability of being a victim and paying bribes is increased 
in schools with households reporting that teachers influence the exam results. The marginal 
effects reported in column 4 of Table 2 indicate that parents are likely to report 11.7 percentage 
points  more  harassment  for  their  children’s  admission  in  those  schools  with  teachers 
influencing the exam results.      
Next  we  estimate  a Tobit  model  for  the  amount of  bribe  paid  by  parents  to  get  child’s 
admission into school. The result is also consistent with that of the probit model; educated, 
older people and richer households pay less as indicated by the statistically significant negative 
coefficient on the log of the expenditure variable. Therefore, combining probit estimates from 
above,  we  see  that  poor  people  are  subject  to  bribe  more  frequently  and  pay  a  higher 18 
 
proportion of their income as bribes. The results also show that parents need to pay higher 
bribes  to  get  their  children  admitted  into  schools  where  classes  are  held  irregularly  and 
teachers influence the exam results. It is likely that the later variables are highly correlated with 
the outcome variable, and hence the coefficient estimates might not represent the causal effect. 
The coefficient estimates of other variables remain intact with or without these school-level 
characteristics (regular class, private tuition, and exam influence). 
We also analyze the probability of obtaining a stipend based on a probit model (see Table 
5), and the amount of bribe paid to secure the award based on a Tobit model (see Table 6). We 
use as a dependent variable the answers to the survey question asking households of eligible 
children about difficulty in getting stipend money from the school authority. It is assumed that 
the dependent variable is equal to 1 if a household reports that it faced a problem in getting 
stipend money, and zero otherwise.  The point estimates indicate that households with higher 
permanent income, as measured by log of total expenditure, are likely to face fewer problems. 
Thus children of poor people are more likely to be the victim of not getting the stipend or have 
problems getting the stipend money. The results also suggest that rich parents pay smaller 
amounts in bribes. Both parents of boys and girls have reported increased probability of not 
getting  the  stipend,  but  the  probability  is  higher  in  the  case  of  girls.    And  moreover,  girls’ 
parents  are  paying  bribes  significantly  more  than  boys’.  This  is  likely  because  most  of  the 
stipends are targeted towards girls, and thus they engage with teachers more often than boys. 
Interestingly, parents who report their children are privately taught by their school teachers 
outside  school  hours  also  report  higher  probability  of  difficulty  in  getting  the  stipend.  On 
average the difficulty of getting stipend money is 17-19 percentage points higher in schools with 
teachers  forcing  children  to  obtain  private  tuition  under  their  tutelage.  This  indicates  that 
school teachers generate multiple layers of red tape for the children and their parents, and 
merely satisfying teachers by sending children to them for private tuition might not be enough 
to counter other problems students face in schools.  
The survey asked households about any payments they made to the school authority (e.g., 
school teachers, school management committee) without receipt which they term as illegal. If 
these payments are done for improving school infrastructure or for a general purpose we would 
expect richer households are expected to pay more. However, we find the opposite—poorer 
households are more likely to pay donations as reflected by the negative coefficients of land and 
household  permanent  income  (Table  7).  We  also  estimate  a  Tobit  regression  where  the 
dependent variable is informal payments made to school for different reasons (e.g., in the name 
of some extracurricular activity, classroom renovation, etc.). These fees can be considered as a 
form of extortion by teachers from students. The results indicate that better educated, higher 
income households do pay less (Table 8). In other words, poor people are subject to more 19 
 
extortion. The results are similar when we add all types of bribes and donations (Table 9). The 
coefficient corresponding to the permanent income variable is negative and the estimated value 
is tk. 300-450. Since the dependent variable is not in logarithmic form, we need to divide the 
coefficient  by  the  value  of  the  dependent  variable  to  calculate  the  income  elasticity.  The 
resulting elasticities are always greater than one in absolute values. This means that richer 
households not only pay less in bribes, but the amount of bribe which is paid is reduced more 
than proportionately with the increase in income. 
With  respect  to  other  factors  that  affect  corruption  in  education  sector  we  find  the 
following.  The  above-mentioned  “voluntary”  donations  and  extortion  are  higher  in  schools 
where parents report irregularity in holding classes or forcing children to go to private tuition 
and where teachers influence exam results. This indicates the rent captured by teachers from 
various sources. The point estimates do not differ much with or without thana fixed effects. If 
the results were due to specific area which are either very corrupt or fair then the fixed effects 
would take those into account. Overall the point estimates are generally slightly lower with 
fixed effects but the sign remains the same. These results imply that such corruption is more of 
a general phenomenon in Bangladesh rather than a local one. In all specifications, we also find 
that the religious status of households plays no role in paying bribes or making other illicit 
payments. In this aspect our results differ from Dincer (2008) who finds a positive and linear 
relationship  between  ethnic/religious  polarization  and  corruption  and  an  inverse-U-shaped 
relationship between ethnic/religious fractionalization and corruption. 
Most importantly,  our  results  are opposite  to  what  is  reported  by  Hunt  (2004,  2007b), 
Svensson (2003), and Mocan (2004). These authors reported that the burden of non-collusive 
corruption rises with the income of the private agent dealing with the bureaucrat. For example, 
both Hunt (2004)  and Mocan(2004) examine the bribes using data cross- country data, and 
find that individuals with higher income are more likely to be asked for bribes, and rich people 
pay the most bribes while poor the least. However, Hunt (2004)   also finds that the factor such 
as city size, age, sex, and ownership of a car all have a larger effect on bribery than income. 
Similar results are obtained by Hunt (2007b) in a study of the public health care in Peru and 
Uganda, and Svensson (2003) in a study of firms paying bribes.  We believe that this difference 
can be explained by the idea that overall higher income people are more active and hence, have 
higher demand for public services, and thus, pay more bribes overall.  In other words, in terms 
of an individual transaction, the burden of bribes still can be lower, for wealthier people than for 
the poorer people. The results could also depend on the nature of the service. Unlike healthcare, 
where  people  can  choose  doctors  and  hospitals,  the  education  provider  is  a  monopoly, 
especially in rural areas, because parents (practically) do not have choice to alternative schools. 
In this aspect, our findings support Hunt (2007a), who demonstrates that the need for public 20 
 
services drives the bribery not the income level per se. In addition, the gains from informal 
networks decreases the burden on non-collusive corruption on the rich, while the poor lacking 
access to such networks have to shoulder the brunt of corruption. In other words, in terms of an 
individual transaction, the burden of bribes still can be lower, for wealthier people than for the 
poorer people. The results could also depend on the nature of the service. Unlike healthcare, 
where  people  can  choose  doctors  and  hospitals,  the  education  provider  is  a  monopoly, 
especially in rural areas, because parents (practically) do not have choice to alternative schools. 
Based on our results we also conclude that corrupt public agents in the education sector can 
discriminate  private  agents  based  on  their  individual  characteristics.  Hence,  our  results 
complement  the  findings  on  the  price  discrimination  of  truck  drivers  by  Olken  and  Barron 
(2009).  
 
6.1 Robustness Check 
A major concern regarding the network variable is that it is potentially endogenous. Thus, we 
consider using an instrumental variable (IV) to address endogeneity. We use education of the 
household head to instrument fornetwork. The first stage results, reported in Table 10, show 
that  the  instrument  is  highly  correlated  with  the  network  variable.  Thus,  our  instrument 
satisfies  the  first  requirement- correlation.  However,  satisfying  the  exclusion  restriction  is  a 
concern.  That  is,  the  education  level  of  the  household  head  has  no  direct  influence  on  the 
household experiencing corruption at school level other than through its effect on network.  We 
include  most variables that  can influence  corruption (such  as income,  assets which  are  also 
good proxy for education) as independent controls in the econometric model.  If the exclusion 
restriction  is  not  satisfied  then  the  bias  associated  with  the  IV  estimate  is  larger  than  ou r 
previous estimates (using OLS/Tobit). Therefore, such bias is likely to make the resulting point 
estimates  not  useful  for  policy  analysis.  Nevertheless  we  can  still  potentially  use  the  point 
estimates to address our question. We also note that our main concern is not to estimate the 
causal impact of the network although causality is of special interest to policy makers. In the 
absence  of  any  causal  interpretation,  our  results  would  still  be  meaningful  to  identify  an 
important source of petty corruption. Since we are not talking about aggregate corruption or 
political corruption, education is likely to serve better instrument than otherwise. 
The IV regression results using full set of controls for different corruption -related binary 
and amount of  bribe  variables are  reported in Tables 11.  In all  binary cases,  the  coefficient 
estimates corresponding to the network variable are consistent with our previous estimates. 
The point estimates are negative and statistically significant (except one) which again indicates 
that people with network connections are less likely to bribe or face less difficulty in school in 
educating their children. When we report the results using the amount of bribes paid as the 21 
 
outcome variable, we also find negative and significant coefficient estimates for the network 
variable (Table 12). The point estimates here are larger than the OLS estimates, suggesting that 
there could be reporting bias or measurement error in the network variable that might cause 
the OLS estimate towards zero. Our results are show that the network variable is an important 
factor which reduces the reporting of corruption and extent of bribery. Without taking into 
account  of  such  ‘silent  corruption’  caused  by  network,  the  corruption  statistics  would  be 
downward bias.  
The  estimated  coefficients  of  other  variables  are  similar  to  that  of  previous  estimates. 
Number of girls studying continues to be a factor of bribing more than the number of boys. 
Because girls are getting stipends more than boys, the results are more likely an indicative of 
corruption rather than indicating it as gender bias. Similarly, we find the older people are less 
likely to bribe and pay less amount of bribe. These people are more likely to have established 
networks than younger people, and hence, they need to face less harassment and pay fewer 
bribes. The minority status as reflected by the variable ‘religion’ has no effect on either the 
probability or the amount of bribe. 
We also change the network variable to check the robustness of our results. In the survey, 
households were asked to report problems they faced related to various sectors such as land, 
electricity,  police  and  judiciary,  local  government,  NGO,  etc.  The  survey  asked  households 
whether they actually received any big personal help from friends, relatives, neighbors, or local 
elected representative, leader of the political party, etc in last one year. We use this information 
to construct a new network variable and redo our estimations with the previous specification. 
We report the results of the new network variable in Table 13 where the upper panel reports 
the  results  using  binary  dependent  variable,  and  lower  panel  reports  results  using  Tobit 
regression. The results are similar, but the point estimates are smaller. However, many of these 
people did not face any problem in education related services from schools because they do not 
have any child in school. So, these results are based on different sample size, but they also show 
that network connections matter. 
6.  Conclusion 
We study non-collusive corruption in the education sector. We construct a simple theoretical 
model  that  captures  the  non-collusive  corruption  between  service  providers  (teachers)  and 
service demanders (students). The model allows to show that the bribe paid by the service 
demander  increase  with  the  level  of  red  tape,  and  decrease  with  the  improvement  of  the 
individual’s social status.  We also establish that with the increase in the income and the social 
status of the private agent (networks), the probability of paying bribes and the severity of red 
tape declines.   22 
 
We focus on the education sector which is the largest or second largest budget item in 
most countries, and opportunities for corrupt practices are numerous. We are interested in 
petty corruption in this sector which affects the daily life of poor people in developing countries. 
The empirical estimates, based on the survey data set collected in Bangladesh for 2007, confirm 
that  both  the  probability  of  being  subjected  to  non-collusive  corruption  and  the  cost  of 
corruption is related to the individual characteristics of the bribe payer. Moreover, network 
connections are important factor that helps ease the burden of corruption on the private agents, 
which is also likely enforcing the persistent of this type of corruption. Specifically, the results 
indicate that better educated, higher income households are less subject to harassment and they 
pay less bribe or additional fees both in seeking admission of the children into school or in 
obtaining stipend money. This means that corruption at the school level would create unequal 
access to education, resulting more drop-outs from economically backward groups.  The results 
show that informal network matters—people with network are less likely to pay bribe and do 
pay significantly less. We also find that older, richer households pay less. Overall, our results 
indicate that the burden of corruption is disproportionately borne to the poor as they are more 
likely to pay, and pay more amounts. Such corruption is like to exacerbate inequality and create 
long-term poverty, and hampers growth (see, for example, Murio 1995). Our results are not 
directly comparable with studies that find rich people bribe more frequently and pay more as 
unlike other studies (1) we are dealing with a almost homogenous service provider (2) police 
or mainstream public administration do not play any direct role in such corruption or extortion. 
Overall,  our  findings  indicate  that  there  is  a  lot  of  ‘hidden’  corruption  which  are  mostly 
unreported  and  unrecognized,  and  they  need  to  be  considered  in  formulating  any  antic-
corruption policy. This type of corruption increases inequality and marginalized some groups in 
the society, and is likely the important bottleneck for formation of human capital. 
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Appendix A.1  Proof of the Proposition. 
Based on (14) we can verify that an increase in red tape will lead to an increase in the bribe 
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which means that with a higher social status or stronger network connections the bribe paid 
declines. 
In our model, the probability of paying bribes is captured as the value of the fraction of 
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Based  on  (18)  we  can  establish  the  direction  of  the  change  in  the  occurrence  of  non-
collusive corruption following the changes in the variables or parameters of the model. It can be 
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. Thus we conclude that with the improvement of the social status or 
network standing the level of red tape decreases. This outcome seems quite intuitive.  24 
 
Appendix A.2 Tables 
Table 1:  Basic Descriptive Statistics 
 
Rural  Urban 
Exogenous variables  Mean  S.D  Mean  S.D 
Age (years)  47.39  14.39  46.5  13.48 
Sex (Male=1)  0.94  0.24  0.91  0.29 
Education (years)  4.73  3.99  7.63  4.91 
Religion (Muslim=1)  0.9  0.3  0.9  0.3 
Sex of the Respondent   0.87  0.34  0.73  0.45 
Number of female adults  2.67  1.43  2.65  1.45 
Number of male adults  3.03  1.6  2.92  1.58 
Total land owned (decimal)  154.73  309.13  114.46  354.57 
Log of expenditure (taka)  8.48  0.56  8.96  0.66 
Number of girls studying  0.92  0.82  0.94  0.85 
Number of boys studying  0.98  0.86  1  0.85 
regular class (yes/no)  0.14  0.35  0.12  0.32 
private tuition (yes/no)  0.32  0.47  0.31  0.46 
Exam influence (yes/no)  0.07  0.26  0.11  0.31 
Outcome variables 
        Victim of admission (yes/no)  0.13  0.34  0.09  0.29 
Bribe for admission (yes/no)  0.11  0.31  0.05  0.23 
Bribe for admission (amount in 
tk.)* 
211.44  1616.90  1039.81  4189.50 
Harassed to get stipend (yes/no)  0.45  0.5  0.24  0.43 
Bribe for stipend (amount in tk.)*  85.80  120.32  115.38  174.40 
Extra fee (amount in tk.)*  67.13  149.39  84.09  165.08 
Donation without receipt (yes/no)  0.22  0.42  0.13  0.33 
Faced any irregularity in school 
(yes/no) 
0.43  0.49  0.36  0.48 
Total bribe (amount in tk.)*  155.87  1185.93  496.24  2766.82 
Number of Observations  2154  1482 
Notes: Number of observations varies depending on the outcome variables. 






Table 2: victim in seeking child admission to school (dependent variable =1, 0) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Police Station Fixed 
effects 
No  No  Yes  Yes 
network    -0.038004    -0.011088 
    (0.023495)    (0.033868) 
Age   -0.000370  -0.000724  -0.000362  -0.000289 
  (0.000644)  (0.001159)  (0.000734)  (0.001380) 
sex  0.013146  0.008364  0.008653  -0.027048 
  (0.032845)  (0.063359)  (0.040902)  (0.088186) 
education  -0.004672*  -0.006837+  -0.004630*  -0.006189 
  (0.002000)  (0.003699)  (0.002312)  (0.004630) 
religion  0.038513+  0.072099+  0.031643  0.033183 
  (0.022639)  (0.037862)  (0.028150)  (0.053556) 
land  -0.000066+  -0.000081    -0.000081+  -0.000090 
  (0.000040)  (0.000062)  (0.000045)  (0.000072) 
expenditure  -0.004750  -0.009570  -0.004428  -0.036568 
  (0.019769)  (0.034324)  (0.022852)  (0.045841) 
girl  0.010493  0.011042  0.021684+  0.036024 
  (0.010606)  (0.019883)  (0.013043)  (0.026153) 
boy  0.009541  -0.000099  0.015096  0.001898 
  (0.010479)  (0.018686)  (0.010587)  (0.019775) 
Regular class  0.032956  -0.019875  0.029800  -0.028301 
  (0.022549)  (0.027544)  (0.026022)  (0.035349) 
Private tuition  0.015869  -0.005249  0.011876  0.000800 
  (0.013890)  (0.025797)  (0.018277)  (0.033889) 
Exam influence  0.146227**  0.099674*  0.165043**  0.117828* 
  (0.034233)  (0.039210)  (0.043233)  (0.050796) 
Observations  1968  1043  1684  897 
Each regression also includes household size (number of male members and number of female members) and 
sex of the respondent. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and they are clustered at the police station 
level, **, * , +  denote significant at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively. 26 
 
Table 3: whether paid any bribe for admission into school 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Police Station Fixed 
effects 
No  No  Yes  Yes 
network    -0.129723**    -0.152042** 
    (0.023625)    (0.030161) 
Age   -0.000962+  -0.001826*  -0.000926  -0.001526 
  (0.000523)  (0.000924)  (0.000653)  (0.001127) 
sex  0.023981  0.036531  0.021610  0.010232 
  (0.020745)  (0.037148)  (0.030238)  (0.065453) 
education  -0.004912**  -0.007062*  -0.005349**  -0.007730+ 
  (0.001637)  (0.003315)  (0.002033)  (0.004648) 
religion  0.016776  0.031514  0.005415  -0.046224 
  (0.021128)  (0.034596)  (0.029768)  (0.062986) 
land  -0.000043  -0.000063  -0.000058+  -0.000070 
  (0.000030)  (0.000042)  (0.000033)  (0.000052) 
expenditure  -0.019879  -0.011018  -0.026465  -0.038338 
  (0.015706)  (0.027263)  (0.021276)  (0.041614) 
girl  -0.003495  -0.017852  0.001381  -0.002303 
  (0.007765)  (0.014218)  (0.009597)  (0.019668) 
boy  0.002742  -0.009463  0.006572  -0.011179 
  (0.007689)  (0.013309)  (0.008770)  (0.015034) 
Regular class  0.041991*  0.000563  0.048127+  0.008006 
  (0.020087)  (0.023418)  (0.026797)  (0.035873) 
Private tuition  0.011176  -0.002297  0.013370  0.007087 
  (0.012037)  (0.021486)  (0.017320)  (0.029217) 
Exam influence  0.080821**  0.036236  0.112638**  0.069504 
  (0.027412)  (0.032780)  (0.036632)  (0.043478) 
Observations  2004  1058  1511  809 
Each regression also includes household size (number of male members and number of female members) and 
sex  of  the  respondent.  The  coefficient  estimates  are  probit  marginal  effect  where  the  binary  dependent 
variable is whether a household paid any bribe for child’s admission to school or not. Standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis and they are clustered at the police station level. **, * , +  denote significant at 1, 5, 10 




Table 4: amount of donation/bribe to get admission 
  (1)  (3)  (5)  (7) 
Police Station Fixed 
effects 
No  No  Yes  Yes 
network    -699.07**    -528.71* 
    (245.07)    (241.65) 
Age   -20.40+  -23.51+  -21.14+  -21.13 
  (11.81)  (13.83)  (12.01)  (13.43) 
sex  -167.18  -411.64  -151.34  -296.21 
  (457.93)  (601.22)  (480.81)  (545.87) 
education  -24.88  -17.29  -15.02  -4.860 
  (30.36)  (27.75)  (26.10)  (24.50) 
religion  488.20  564.48  556.80  496.82 
  (416.13)  (445.95)  (447.67)  (447.26) 
land  -0.08  0.004  -0.276  -0.097 
  (0.25)  (0.190)  (0.338)  (0.213) 
expenditure  -640.87*  -617.87+  -454.39  -525.97 
  (299.79)  (324.88)  (308.72)  (356.88) 
girl  481.35**  498.53**  586.39**  612.95** 
  (158.60)  (167.23)  (175.33)  (193.98) 
boy  163.55  80.70  235.62  103.28 
  (137.77)  (140.36)  (150.73)  (127.60) 
Regular class  742.37*  119.46  591.917+  90.01 
  (354.60)  (241.26)  (339.54)  (262.09) 
Private tuition  411.98+  246.46  342.45  211.31 
  (240.44)  (218.42)  (232.44)  (213.33) 
Exam influence  1,129.52*  495.59  1,171.35*  603.02 
  (494.91)  (355.54)  (521.63)  (377.55) 
Observations  3452  1751  3448  1748 
Each regression also includes household size (number of male members and number of female members) and 
sex of the respondent. The coefficient estimates are reported using Tobit regression where the dependent 
variable  is  amount  of  illegal  payments  made  to  admit  child  to  a  school.  Standard  errors  are  reported  in 
parenthesis and they are clustered at the police station level. **, * , +  denote significant at 1, 5, 10 percent 
level, respectively. 28 
 
Table 5: whether victim in getting stipend money 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Police Station 
Fixed effects 
No  No  Yes  Yes 
network    0.020763    0.021918 
    (0.031780)    (0.030022) 
Age   0.001106  0.001880  0.001472  0.002955+ 
  (0.000921)  (0.001448)  (0.000970)  (0.001594) 
sex  0.015656  0.004944  0.013745  0.029966 
  (0.049726)  (0.071950)  (0.053956)  (0.079895) 
education  0.001906  0.002099  0.003473  0.004425 
  (0.002252)  (0.003743)  (0.002328)  (0.004242) 
religion  -0.006990  0.002150  0.009770  0.031311 
  (0.045093)  (0.061697)  (0.049313)  (0.073852) 
land  0.000050  0.000049  -0.000001  -0.000024 
  (0.000048)  (0.000068)  (0.000054)  (0.000086) 
expenditure  -0.150363**  -0.199169**  -0.117712**  -0.150686** 
  (0.027513)  (0.040514)  (0.029978)  (0.050418) 
Girl  0.109241**  0.110072**  0.131430**  0.140485** 
  (0.021097)  (0.031920)  (0.022787)  (0.036397) 
Boy  0.043272**  0.053119**  0.049475**  0.060240** 
  (0.015077)  (0.018486)  (0.016331)  (0.022243) 
Regular class  -0.016160  -0.058179  -0.025689  -0.063417 
  (0.030671)  (0.037078)  (0.033806)  (0.044582) 
Private tuition  0.183467**  0.175709**  0.190675**  0.191505** 
  (0.027043)  (0.038902)  (0.028179)  (0.044253) 
Exam influence  -0.007185  -0.028746  0.022544  0.011728 
  (0.039052)  (0.041744)  (0.040335)  (0.045755) 
Observations  2075  1091  2038  1049 
Each regression also includes household size (number of male members and number of female members) and 
sex  of  the  respondent.  The  coefficient  estimates  are  probit  marginal  effect  where  the  binary  dependent 
variable is whether a household faced any harassment in getting child’s stipend money. Standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis and they are clustered at the police station level. **, * , +  denote significant at 1, 5, 10 
percent level, respectively. 
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Table 6: amount of donation/bribe to get stipend 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Police Station Fixed 
effects 
No  No  Yes  Yes 
network    -51.838*    -21.34 
    (20.149)    (19.56) 
Age   -1.61*  -1.74**  -1.70**  -1.74** 
  (0.63)  (0.61)  (0.62)  (0.59) 
sex  52.88  33.94  62.514+  43.15 
  (36.17)  (33.45)  (35.44)  (34.91) 
education  -1.01  -0.698  -0.255  0.411 
  (2.12)  (1.76)  (1.90)  (2.23) 
religion  67.93  62.07  91.04+  91.42* 
  (49.58)  (43.02)  (47.88)  (43.79) 
land  -0.019  -0.014  -0.045  -0.040 
  (0.029)  (0.024)  (0.038)  (0.042) 
expenditure  -65.14**  -49.21*  -49.36*  -43.28 
  (20.06)  (21.16)  (20.81)  (26.89) 
girl  105.82**  99.19**  113.72**  104.26** 
  (16.64)  (16.87)  (18.83)  (20.63) 
boy  -6.645  -8.30  2.622  -2.38 
  (14.17)  (14.05)  (15.07)  (15.93) 
Regular class  46.14+  -2.62  21.95  -19.60 
  (26.87)  (25.16)  (26.61)  (25.86) 
Private tuition  28.42  4.66  22.25  2.863 
  (18.41)  (18.61)  (18.91)  (19.19) 
Exam influence  83.10**  26.32  102.57**  61.97+ 
  (29.92)  (27.33)  (35.27)  (31.81) 
Observations  1973  1009  1971  1008 
Each regression also includes household size (number of male members and number of female members) and 
sex of the respondent. The coefficient estimates are reported using Tobit regression where the dependent 
variable is amount of illegal payments made to get stipend money from school. Standard errors are reported in 







Table 7: did you pay any donation without receipt at which your child is studying 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Police Station 
Fixed effects 
No  No  Yes  Yes 
network    -0.185704**    -0.176996** 
    (0.033594)    (0.039523) 
Age   -0.000193  -0.000611  -0.000111  -0.000357 
  (0.000507)  (0.001120)  (0.000548)  (0.001335) 
sex  0.023576  0.047840  0.030838  0.082589+ 
  (0.030031)  (0.047499)  (0.027744)  (0.046294) 
education  -0.007359**  -0.010633**  -0.007867**  -0.011190** 
  (0.002359)  (0.004086)  (0.002161)  (0.003725) 
religion  -0.013027  -0.013911  -0.001176  -0.000030 
  (0.034247)  (0.058310)  (0.036341)  (0.067544) 
land  -0.000038  -0.000066  -0.000066+  -0.000103+ 
  (0.000028)  (0.000041)  (0.000035)  (0.000062) 
expenditure  -0.079004**  -0.097210**  -0.074691**  -0.101298** 
  (0.019882)  (0.035136)  (0.019393)  (0.036668) 
Girl  0.007965  -0.006241  0.018255  0.004621 
  (0.010620)  (0.019286)  (0.011237)  (0.021917) 
Boy  0.016176  0.005852  0.021643+  0.007890 
  (0.011466)  (0.019665)  (0.011430)  (0.020874) 
Regular class  0.146879**  0.041330  0.104772**  0.006286 
  (0.025330)  (0.036159)  (0.024688)  (0.036444) 
Private tuition  0.027352  -0.040212  0.036478+  -0.005591 
  (0.016704)  (0.029303)  (0.018763)  (0.037191) 
Exam influence  0.104800**  -0.023162  0.126021**  0.020789 
  (0.033641)  (0.036550)  (0.036914)  (0.045004) 
Observations  3025  1505  2885  1459 
Each regression also includes household size (number of male members and number of female members) and 
sex of the respondent. The coefficient estimates are probit marginal effect where the binary dependent 
variable is whether a household paid any illegal payments to school authority. Standard errors are reported in 







Table 8: Extra fee paid to school for different reasons 
  (1)  (3)  (5)  (7) 
Police Station Fixed 
effects 
No  No  Yes  Yes 
network    -74.59**    -63.10** 
    (19.32)    (22.02) 
Age   -0.078  -0.148  0.019  0.055 
  (0.486)  (0.594)  (0.513)  (0.64) 
sex  21.86  23.72  25.13  27.64 
  (30.87)  (31.36)  (30.23)  (31.36) 
education  -4.09*  -3.18+  -3.832*  -2.60+ 
  (2.01)  (1.86)  (1.62)  (1.34) 
religion  -15.30  -10.25  -11.86  -14.72 
  (26.71)  (29.82)  (29.29)  (32.55) 
land  -0.041  -0.048  -0.061+  -0.065+ 
  (0.027)  (0.031)  (0.033)  (0.037) 
 expenditure  -46.82**  -31.84*  -46.33**  -28.84+ 
  (13.62)  (14.43)  (15.54)  (16.15) 
girl  13.28  7.67  21.36+  14.11 
  (10.40)  (12.06)  (12.19)  (13.80) 
boy  23.53*  18.87  24.75*  17.35 
  (11.55)  (12.42)  (10.48)  (11.57) 
Regular class  102.92**  38.42*  73.46**  18.97 
  (22.07)  (17.35)  (19.22)  (17.11) 
Private tuition  32.19*  14.29  35.53*  24.10 
  (15.79)  (17.39)  (16.44)  (19.73) 
Exam influence  82.86**  18.53  88.37**  31.96 
  (24.25)  (20.99)  (25.40)  (21.70) 
Observations  3085  1531  3081  1528 
Each  regression  also  includes  household  size  (number  of  male  members  and  number  of  female 
members) and sex of the respondent. The coefficient estimates are reported using Tobit regression 
where the dependent variable is total amount of different fees paid to school. Standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis and they are clustered at the police station level. **, * , +  denote significant 
at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively. 32 
 
Table 9: total bribe paid for admission, PLUS extra fee to school for different purposes 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Police Station Fixed 
effects 
No  No  Yes  Yes 
Network    -608.99**    -474.20** 
    (173.99)    (151.13) 
Age   -9.25  -11.70+  -9.27  -10.18 
  (5.75)  (7.04)  (5.71)  (6.64) 
sex  -153.94  -296.16  -143.78  -184.68 
  (307.58)  (412.58)  (320.98)  (369.22) 
education  -26.18  -21.47  -25.66  -18.22 
  (22.85)  (21.25)  (18.26)  (15.46) 
religion  44.49  98.34  63.56  56.52 
  (191.11)  (211.22)  (216.16)  (226.26) 
land  -0.11  -0.066  -0.221  -0.102 
  (0.14)  (0.124)  (0.185)  (0.129) 
expenditure  -448.81*  -404.29+  -319.75  -299.77 
  (205.47)  (227.88)  (197.91)  (220.93) 
Girl  194.66**  173.04*  240.47**  220.01** 
  (69.36)  (74.13)  (75.18)  (80.64) 
Boy  129.70  78.56  164.62+  82.45 
  (92.65)  (93.76)  (97.82)  (82.25) 
Regular class  706.51**  195.74  559.58*  146.48 
  (270.58)  (159.57)  (239.88)  (159.48) 
Private tuition  263.61+  111.87  220.49  80.92 
  (150.54)  (125.79)  (136.30)  (114.87) 
Exam influence  708.45*  189.55  730.89*  260.96 
  (299.96)  (187.79)  (318.37)  (211.54) 
Observations  3453  1752  3449  1749 
The coefficient estimates are reported using Tobit regression where the dependent variable is total amount 
bribes or illegal money paid to school. Each regression also includes household size (number of male members 
and number of female members) and sex of the respondent. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and 
they are clustered at the police station level. **, * , +  denote significant at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 10: First-Stage Results (dependent variable is binary Network variable) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 







education  0.04519**  0.03830**  0.03797** 
  (0.00847)  (0.01142)  (0.01088) 
Age     -0.00133  -0.00176 
    (0.00254)  (0.00295) 
sex    -0.04592  0.00419 
    (0.13801)  (0.15602) 
religion    -0.04633  -0.15923 
    (0.14709)  (0.16813) 
land    -0.00013  -0.00010 
    (0.00012)  (0.00010) 
expenditure    0.39932**  0.41687** 
    (0.09179)  (0.09836) 
girl    -0.02655  0.00820 
    (0.04406)  (0.04920) 
boy    -0.00824  0.03656 
    (0.04671)  (0.05383) 
Regular class    -0.41029**  -0.39398** 
    (0.08763)  (0.09921) 
Private tuition    -0.24200**  -0.27422** 
    (0.07696)  (0.08392) 
Exam influence    -0.26879**  -0.23019** 
    (0.08045)  (0.08912) 
Observations  2083  1749  1660 
Each  regression  also  includes  household  size  (number  of  male  members  and  number  of  female 
members)  and  sex  of  the  respondent.  Standard  errors  are  reported  in  parenthesis  and  they  are 
clustered at the police station level. **, * , +  denote significant at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively. 34 
 
Table 11: IV estimates (Binary outcome) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Variables  Any 
irregularity 
in school  
Victim of 
admission  
Did you Bribe 






Network  -0.951140**  -0.529392+  -0.614481*  -0.019936  -1.102652** 
  (0.182527)  (0.319621)  (0.297842)  (0.298251)  (0.423111) 
Age   -0.000381  -0.001004  -0.002018+  0.001673  -0.001442 
  (0.000681)  (0.001243)  (0.001074)  (0.001339)  (0.001521) 
Sex  -0.002156  -0.006760  0.030209  0.010466  0.005431 
  (0.042977)  (0.075378)  (0.054790)  (0.065975)  (0.070934) 
education  -0.008746  0.074497  0.039112  0.000834  -0.024180 
  (0.033670)  (0.048255)  (0.050043)  (0.058106)  (0.081144) 
Religion  -0.000033+  -0.000055*  -0.000046**  0.000048  -0.000068* 
  (0.000018)  (0.000022)  (0.000018)  (0.000060)  (0.000032) 
Land  0.044244  0.078310  0.076727  -0.167504**  0.030589 
  (0.040876)  (0.083930)  (0.074424)  (0.063404)  (0.078456) 
expenditure  0.057039**  0.009667  -0.024165  0.106039**  0.001632 
  (0.014157)  (0.022147)  (0.017771)  (0.028727)  (0.023229) 
Girl  0.012543  -0.000831  -0.009521  0.047662**  -0.003370 
  (0.012320)  (0.022107)  (0.018193)  (0.017550)  (0.024054) 
Boy  0.057103+  -0.081601+  -0.062167  -0.059198  -0.075260 
  (0.031408)  (0.047463)  (0.043634)  (0.053206)  (0.072010) 
Regular class  0.023013  -0.065033  -0.068168  0.164575**  -0.109436* 
  (0.026709)  (0.046385)  (0.041819)  (0.040598)  (0.053509) 
Private tuition  0.086885**  0.028790  -0.026386  -0.028420  -0.093950+ 
  (0.030064)  (0.059013)  (0.045876)  (0.038935)  (0.052547) 
Exam influence  0.734785**  -0.142888  -0.116997  1.605888**  0.537591 
  (0.250856)  (0.530515)  (0.468262)  (0.418555)  (0.493489) 
Observations  1747  1043  1058  1091  1505 
The estimates are obtained using education of the household head as instrument for network, and all the 
dependent variables are binary. Each regression also includes household size (number of male members and 
number of female members), sex of  the respondent, and police station fixed effects.  Standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis and they are clustered at the police station level. **, * , +  denote significant at 1, 5, 10 





Table 12: Tobit Estimates, Network is instrumented 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




Extra fee   Total bribe 
Network   -24.26  -342.63+  -224.63  -2,486.89+ 
  (464.51)  (176.27)  (137.43)  (1,342.46) 
Age   -3.43  -2.02**  -0.19  -12.17+ 
  (2.76)  (0.64)  (0.54)  (6.59) 
sex  -280.9  56.54  20.52  -174.56 
  (190.45)  (36.05)  (32.60)  (346.19) 
religion  -4.38  73.09  -28.66  -115.51 
  (32.25)  (50.99)  (31.70)  (238.18) 
land  0.0345  -0.04  -0.09*  -0.33+ 
  (0.0466)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.20) 
expenditure  34.6  -9.13  -20.77  4.16 
  (145.82)  (33.86)  (24.84)  (298.93) 
girl  7.81736  119.19**  23.17+  274.40** 
  (22.58)  (20.08)  (12.83)  (80.71) 
boy  44.61  2.21  28.05*  205.52+ 
  (34.82)  (17.43)  (11.52)  (112.92) 
Regular class  50.46  -12.08  43.77*  287.00 
  (50.72)  (32.28)  (21.57)  (185.85) 
Private tuition  36.96  -8.42  20.16  -0.27 
  (60.43)  (26.55)  (21.87)  (145.99) 
Exam influence  64.71  89.60*  80.21**  601.68* 
  (72.92)  (36.50)  (27.13)  (280.11) 
Observations  1748  1844  2849  3212 
The estimates are obtained using education of the household head as instrument for network, and 
run Tobit regression in the second stage where the dependent variables indicate illegal payments or 
bribe. Each regression also includes household size (number of male members and number of female 
members), sex of the respondent, and police station fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis and they are clustered at the police station level. **, * , +  denote significant at 1, 5, 10 







Table 13: Using a different definition of Network: Probit Marginal Effects 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 





Did you Bribe 






network  -0.212318**  0.033874  -0.053052*  0.001317  -0.039509+ 
  (0.033235)  (0.022891)  (0.022207)  (0.026219)  (0.023723) 
Observations  2461  1237  1116  1438  2054 
Each regression includes full set of covariates and police station fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in 





Table 14: Coefficient estimates of Tobit regression for new Network variable  
(dependent Variable: Amount of bribe (in taka) for different purposes) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Variables  Bribe for admission   Bribe for stipend   Extra fee   Total bribe  
network  -115.05  -7.64  -23.63  -172.76+ 
  (183.88) 
 
(18.44)  (18.11)  (89.18) 
Observations  2473  1419  2183  2474 
Each regression includes full set of covariates and police station fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in 




Appendix A.3 Variable definitions 
 
Variables  Description 
Age  Age of the head of the household 
Sex  of the head of the household 
Education  Years of educational attainment of the household head 
Religion  binary variable (1=Muslim, 0=others) 
Household size  two separate variables, number of male adults and number of female adults 
Sex of the respondent 
Girl  number of girls studying in school 
Boy  number of boys studying in school 
Land  Amount of land owned by the household 
Expenditure  log of total household expenditure to proxy permanent income 
Regular class  whether school holds regular class during school period 
Private tuition  whether teachers force students to go to private tuition (under teachers’ 
private arrangement) 
Exam influence  whether teachers influence exam results 
 
Network  dummy variable equal to one if household has network and zero otherwise 
Victim of 
admission 
Whether parents were victim of seeking admission of their child to school in 
last one year 
 
Did you bribe 
for admission 
whether paid bribe for admission into school in last one year 
Bribe for 
admission 
Amount of money paid as bribe for child’s admission in last one year 
Harassed to 
get stipend 




amount of money paid for getting stipend in last one year in last one year 
 








whether faced any irregularity in school in last one year 
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